The effects of end-of-month recruiting on Marine Corps Recruit Repot attrition by Baczkowski, Robert E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-03
The effects of end-of-month recruiting on Marine
Corps Recruit Repot attrition
Baczkowski, Robert E.
Monterey  California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2857










Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
THE EFFECTS OF END-OF-MONTH RECRUITING ON 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:        Stephen L. Mehay 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-
0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per 
response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering 
and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, 
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate 
for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) 
Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  The Effects of End-Of-Month 
Recruiting on Marine Corps Recruit Depot Attrition 
6. AUTHOR(S) Baczkowski Jr., Robert E. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT  
Recruiters, under pressure to meet end-of-month goals, often work feverishly to 
meet their monthly recruiting goals.  This thesis uses regression models to examine the 
effects of day of month of enlistment on Marine Corps Recruit Depot attrition 
percentages to examine the hypothesis that recruiters lower their standards at the end 
of the month in a final effort to make their monthly recruiting mission. 
The Total Force Data Warehouse provided data for over 50,000 recruits who enlisted and 
shipped to recruit training between October 2003 and May 2005.  Of those, over 5,500 
(10.62 percent) failed to complete the prescribed training.  In the logit regression 
models, discharge was modeled against demographic variables such as age, gender, race, 
education level, and AFQT score, as well as variables representing the day of the month 
a recruit enlists (last day, last week, or last 10 days of the month).  Prior research 
has found that DEP attrition is higher for recruits who enter the Marine Corps at the 
end of the month.  By contrast, the data analyzed in this study show that once a Marine 
Corps enlistee ships to a recruit training depot, there is no statistical evidence of 
higher attrition rates in basic training based on the day the recruit enlisted. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
79 
14. SUBJECT TERMS   
Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Attrition, Marine Corps Recruiting Depot 
(MCRD) Attrition, Attrition, Recruit Training 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF END-OF-MONTH RECRUITING ON MARINE CORPS 
RECRUIT DEPOT ATTRITION 
 
Robert E. Baczkowski Jr. 
Captain, United States Marine Corps 
A.S., University of Cincinnati, 1991 
B.S., Miami University (Ohio), 2000 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Robert N. Beck 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Recruiters, under pressure to meet end-of-month goals, 
often work feverishly to meet their monthly recruiting 
goals.  This thesis uses regression models to examine the 
effects of day of month of enlistment on Marine Corps 
Recruit Depot attrition percentages to examine the 
hypothesis that recruiters lower their standards at the end 
of the month in a final effort to make their monthly 
recruiting mission. 
The Total Force Data Warehouse provided data for over 
50,000 recruits who enlisted and shipped to recruit 
training between October 2003 and May 2005.  Of those, over 
5,500 (10.62 percent) failed to complete the prescribed 
training.  In the logit regression models, discharge was 
modeled against demographic variables such as age, gender, 
race, education level, and AFQT score, as well as variables 
representing the day of the month a recruit enlists (last 
day, last week, or last 10 days of the month).  Prior 
research has found that DEP attrition is higher for 
recruits who enter the Marine Corps at the end of the 
month.  By contrast, the data analyzed in this study show 
that once a Marine Corps enlistee ships to a recruit 
training depot, there is no statistical evidence of higher 
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As the Global War on Terror continues to be fought 
around the globe, Marines are constantly forced to do more 
with less.  Relating to the realm of manpower issues, this 
means making the most efficient use of every dollar when it 
comes to the recruiting and training of young men and women 
to become United States Marines.  There are significant 
costs associated with recruiting applicants and getting 
them across the parade deck as a basic qualified Marine.   
A recent study (Bruno, 2005) concluded that there is a 
significant relationship between the day of the month an 
applicant enlists and the attrition rate of Marines in the 
Delayed Entry Program (DEP) holding constant age, test 
scores, and other demographic variables.  In particular, 
the Bruno study found that applicants who enlisted during 
the last week of the month exhibited higher attrition 
rates.  Possible causes are explained in Chapter II.  This 
research analyzes similar effects of day of month of 
enlistment on attrition levels at the Marine Corps Recruit 
Depots (MCRD).  The outcome of this research is to further 
investigate the impact of time of enlistment on later 
attrition and to provide policy recommendations in order to 
lower MCRD attrition rates. 
 
1. Background 
In 1973, the Armed Forces began a new era that saw the 
end of involuntary induction of males into the military and 
the creation of the all-volunteer force.  To assist the 
services to meet their annual accession requirements of new 
2 
recruits each year, the DEP was created.  This program 
allows applicants to enlist into the military and remain in 
the civilian sector for up to 365 days prior to shipping to 
recruit training.  The Marine Corp’s primary use of the DEP 
is to allow for the even flow of recruits into the training 
pipeline.  Applicants are not legally bound to honor their 
commitment while in the DEP, and those who fail to ship to 
MCRD are classified as DEP attrition while those who ship 




To maintain the all-volunteer force, the Marine Corps 
spends a significant portion of their budget, over $592 
million dollars in fiscal year (FY) 2005, on recruiting and 
advertising which equates to over 16 percent of the entire 
Operation and Maintenance (O & M) Budget for the Marine 
Corps (Department of the Navy (DoN) FY 2005 President’s 
Budget Exhibit O-1).  The recruit depots indicate that the 
average training cost per recruit is $14,320 
(http://www.mcrdpi.usmc.mil/fact_sheet.htm).  Today, it is 
imperative that these scarce resources are spent on only 
the most qualified applicants with the greatest propensity 
to complete entry-level training.  Every time an applicant 
is discharged from the DEP or from recruit training, 
additional funding is needed to replace that individual.  
Over the past three fiscal years, the O & M budget has 
decreased over 34 percent.  Funds allocated to training 
have increased over 9 percent, drawing scarce resources 
from the operating forces and administrative activities 
supported by the O & M account (DoN FY 2005 President’s  
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Budget Exhibit O-1).  Table 1.1 breaks out the Training and 
Recruiting portion of the O & M budget of the Marine Corps 
for FY03 through FY05. 
 
Table 1.1 FY03 – FY05 Training and Recruiting Budget (In 
Thousands of Dollars) 
 
Budget Activity 03: Training and Recruiting  
 FY03 FY04 FY05 
Accession Training    
Recruit Training 10,985 9,844 10,539
Officer Training 425 348 351
Basic Skills and Advanced Training  
Special Skills Training 34,823 40,484 45,155
Flight Training 186 171 174
Professional Training 9,126 8,863 8972
Training Support 113,765 117,856 134,241
Recruiting and other Training and Education  
Recruiting and Advertising 114,403 113,987 113,998
Off-Duty and Voluntary Education 38,032 32,006 34,226
Junior ROTC 13,377 13,700 13,270
Base Support  
Sustainment and Modernization 81,357 79,666 68,553
Base Operating Support 117,363 153,327 162,579
Total for Budget Activity 03 533,842 570,252 592,158
Total Operation and Maintenance  5,525,445 4,608,137 3,632,115
After DoN FY 2005 President’s Budget Exhibit O-1 
http://navweb.secnav.navy.mil/pubbud/05pres/ommc/O1_OMMC_FY05PB 
 
3. Research Questions 
The primary research questions focus on factors 
affecting MCRD attrition rates and current policies.  The 
secondary questions focus on subgroups identified in  
previous research as exhibiting a higher propensity to 
attrite from the DEP to determine if the same attrition 
behavior exists at the MCRDs. 
4 
• Primary Questions 
− What effect does a recruit’s day of the month of 
enlistment have on his or her propensity to 
graduate recruit training? 
− Can policy changes be implemented to reduce 
attrition rates without adding unnecessary 
additional burdens to the recruiting force? 
• Secondary Question 
− What are the immediate and long-term impacts on 
recruiting and attrition rates of proposed 
potential changes? 
 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Although attrition is impossible to eliminate, it is 
crucial that we examine all possibilities that will keep it 
to a minimum.  Prior research shows that applicants with 
specific attributes, who are recruited at different times 
of the month, have different DEP attrition behavior.  The 
data for this thesis was extracted from the Marine Corp’s 
Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) for applicants who 
enlisted and shipped to MCRD between October 2003 and May 
2005.  The data is organized for the purposes of this study 
to determine if those same subgroups who have been 
identified as exhibiting a high risk of DEP attrition also 
exhibit a high risk of MCRD attrition.  If the risk is the 
same, then attrition may be reduced by implementing past  
recommendations.  If the rates are different, then altering 
the recommendations may succeed in reducing attrition at 




Chapter II of this thesis is a literature review that 
examines previous research focused on attrition levels at 
both the DEP and the MCRDs.  Chapter III discusses the data 
and the methodology used in creating the variables and 
groups that are examined using regression analysis.  
Chapter IV examines the regression models used to test 
attrition rates of groups previously identified as having 
high discharge rates in the DEP.  Chapter V summarizes the 
results of this study, provides conclusions, and offers 
recommendations and observations based on the outcomes of 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PREVIOUS MCRD ATTRITION STUDIES 
After the abolishment of the draft, attention quickly 
focused on recruiting quandaries such as the available 
applicant population and the high costs associated with 
high attrition rates.  Many studies have been conducted to 
ensure that the quantity of manpower required for accession 
into the Corps was met with the highest quality of 
applicants available.  
The following chapter discusses in detail four prior 
studies on attrition.  The first analysis was conducted by 
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and identified 
variables used to screen out Marine Corps applicants with 
low propensities to complete 24 months of service (Sims, 
1977. 
The second study, a Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
thesis, compared attrition statistics between Marine Corps 
Recruit Depot (MCRD) Parris Island and MCRD San Diego.  
Additionally, the authors attempted to create profiles of 
Senior Drill Instructors (SDIs) who exhibited high and low 
attrition rates within their respective recruit platoons 
(Carrigan and Franz, 1982). 
Another CNA analysis was reviewed for the third study.  
Building on earlier research (Sims, 1977), along with 
statistics gathered over the ensuing decade, the 
researchers sought to investigate variables that identified 




45-month tour, to achieve promotion to the rank of E-4, and 
reenlist at the end of their first tour (Quester, North, 
and Kimble, 1990). 
The fourth study was a 2005 NPS thesis analyzing 
recruit attrition from the Marine Corps’ Delayed Entry 
Program (DEP).  This study examined variables and their 
interactions to each other, a case was made that different 
categories of applicants attrited at different rates 
depending on whether they were enlisted during the first 
three weeks of the month, or the last 10 days of the month.  
By identifying the characteristics of each category, the 
author proposed that DEP attrition could be reduced by 
quickly identifying those with higher attrition 
propensities prior to their signing enlistment papers 
(Bruno, 2005). 
 
1. Sims (1977) 
Profile of a Successful Marine, a report for the CNA 
by William Sims (1977), focused on the development of a 
profile that Marine Corps recruiters could employ in an 
effort to eliminate potentially unsuccessful recruits.  
Only applicant information such as age, race, education 
level, number of dependents, and aptitude and attitudinal 
test scores from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB) were used in the study.   
Three profiles were created, labeled profile one, 
profile two, and profile three.  The first looked at 
educational level (high school graduate or not), age, and 
an attrition composite developed from components of the 
ASVAB.  The second profile was more conventional, examining 
educational level (high school graduate or not), age, and 
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mental aptitude as determined by raw ASVAB scores.  The 
third profile looked at the same variables as the second 
group; however, educational level was broken down by level 
of education completed ranging from less than eight years 
to more than twelve.  
This information was analyzed to predict attrition as 
well as to predict success at occupational specialty 
schools.  Sims suggested profile three as the best overall 
predictor.  Although profiles one and two had better 
predictions of attrition, they could not predict school 
performance.  Sims also felt the attitudinal portion of the 
attrition composite, due to it transparent nature, could be 
easily altered by recruiters coaching their applicants in 
certain areas prior to taking the exams. 
Sims’ findings still hold true for today’s applicants 
to the Marine Corps.  High school graduates who enlist at 
an early age and have high scores on the ASVAB mental group 
composite typically (on average) make the most successful 
Marines.  His findings concluded that non-high school 
graduates enlisting at an early age with high scores on the 
ASVAB mental group composite also have a propensity to be 
successful.  Statistics showed that once the above 
variables were held constant, race became insignificant.  
Although statistically significant, having dependents was 
found to have little practical significance. 
A problem with this era was the inability of 
recruiters to examine school and police records.  Sims 
noted that attrition rates could be decreased by 4 percent 
if this information were readily obtainable by recruiters 
as they checked applicants for eligibility.  This problem 
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no longer exists since the records are now checked before 
an applicant is accepted into the DEP. 
His research pointed out that the attrition rate in 
general could easily be reduced by screening applicants 
more carefully according to the demographic factors he 
used.  However, rigorous application of the screening 
factors would create additional problems.  Such problems 
included significantly reducing applicant pools, and 
increasing recruiting costs and recruiting efforts.  The 
study concluded that implementing policies to reduce 
attrition by 1 percent would reduce the applicant 
population by 2 percent.  If reduced properly by profiling 
and screening, a portion of these costs will be offset by 
the fact that fewer recruits will be needed to reduce those 
who normally would have attrited. 
 
2. Carrigan and Franz (1982) 
In a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Charles 
Carrigan and Joseph Franz examined recruit attrition by 
comparing the attrition statistics between Parris Island 
and San Diego MCRDs.  Additionally, they attempted to 
construct profiles of Senior Drill Instructors with low and 
high attrition rates.  Data was collected from both MCRDs 
on 38,022 male recruits entering training for the first 
three quarters of fiscal year (FY) 1982.  It was noted that 
the comparison was hindered by dissimilar reporting formats 
and varying classification interpretation. 
Parris Island reported a 12.6 percent attrition rate 
for the period while San Diego reported 20.3 percent for 
the same timeframe.  Although the depots accessed roughly 
the same number of recruits during this interval, San Diego 
11 
had over four times the number of waivers submitted by 
recruiters.  Based on the percentage of approved waivers, 
the authors concluded that the waiver process appeared to 
be almost automatic at the time with a 93.43 percent 
approval covering both MCRDs.   
Attrition was sub-divided into two types: 
administrative and training.  Administrative causes found 
during in-processing accounted for 38.4 percent of Parris 
Island’s attrition and 76.7 percent of San Diego’s.  These 
causes included fraudulent enlistment and existing medical 
conditions, among others.  San Diego had higher rates in 
all subcategories, but the fraudulent enlistment rate of 
46.5 percent was over five times higher at Parris Island.  
The biggest cause of the high administrative attrition was 
attributed to the fact that, at the time of the study, 
recruiters did not have access to all school or police 
records and were required to take the applicant’s word that 
there were no blemishes on the individual’s record.  One of 
the recommendations was the drafting of congressional 
legislation to override differing state laws barring 
recruiters from verifying applicant information. 
Training attrition, those who survived past the 
moment-of-truth, was not sub-categorized.  Parris Island 
reported a 61.6 percent training discharge rate while San 
Diego averaged 23.3 percent.  Neither MCRD maintained 
records identifying the cause of the training attrite.  
Because of this, a significant difference (38.3 percentage 
points) was reported between the two MCRDs but could not be 
properly explained.  Another recommendation from the 
authors was to develop uniform sub-categories for training  
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attrition such as physical fitness, mental, rifle range 
failure etc., in order to allow for future analysis of the 
causes of training attrition. 
In attempting to create SDI profiles, the authors 
collected more data from the MCRDs.  Although this data was 
similar in form between the two depots, much of it was 
incomplete.  In an effort to add strength and stability to 
their statistics, the authors imposed rules requiring SDIs 
to have completed three full training cycles in order to be 
part of the observed data.  This reduced the pool from 540 
SDIs in the cycle to an available group of 62.  Further 
exasperating the problem, complete data was only available 
for 21 of the SDIs.  Partial data on six others allowed 
them to be added into certain categories of the profiling 
process.  High turnover rates were identified as the 
leading cause of failure to complete three series as a SDI.  
Procedures required drill instructors (DI) completing DI 
school to serve as a junior DI for at least one cycle 
before serving as a SDI.  Often, several cycles were 
completed as a junior DI, resulting in many DIs completing 
their two-year tour before they could complete three cycles 
as a SDI.   
Using simple descriptive statistics and multiple 
regressions, the authors examined the effect of rank, years 
of service, months as a DI, age, and standing in DI school 
on attrition.  Due to a lack of available data, there was 
no statistical significance found in any of the variables.  
The authors still contended that SDIs do play a significant 
role in recruit attrition. 
The study offered recommendations that are now part of 
the recruiting process, such as Congressional legislation 
13 
permitting recruiters to obtain police and educational 
records prior to the applicant shipping to MCRD, uniform 
data collection from the two MCRDs, and in-depth data 
collection for MCRD training failures. 
 
3. Quester, North, and Kimble (1990) 
CNA completed another research memorandum on 
attrition, this time observing trends in first term 
attrition and analyzing the link between recruit background 
characteristics and Marine Corps environmental variables 
indicative of successful adjustment to life in the Corps. 
Realizing that high school diploma graduates (HSDG) 
had the highest success rates, the Marine Corps spent the 
1980s working to increase the proportion of accessions that 
were classified as HSDGs.  This proportion grew from 64.4 
percent in 1979 to 95.0 percent in 1989.  In addition, the 
Marine Corps used the results from Sims (1977) to 
substantially increase the number of accessions scoring in 
the top half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).  
The proportion of those classified as AFQT category I-IIIA 
(top 50 percent) grew from 44.3 percent in 1979 to 68.0 
percent in 1989.  The combination of these two variables 
produces a “high quality” applicant.  The percentage of 
this group accessed grew from only 28.9 percent in 1979 to 
62.0 percent in 1989. 
For their research, Quester et al. set three measures 
of success.  The first was the completion of the Marine’s 
first term (45 months of active service).  The second 
measure was completion of a first term and promotion to 
Corporal (E-4) by month 45 of the initial contract.  The 
final measure looked at reenlistment beyond the first term. 
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Variables were chosen for the research from Marine 
Corps administrative records.  Variables such as plans for 
college or holding a steady job, although important, were 
not used because they were only available form special 
surveys and not recorded in the administrative database.  
The variables were grouped into two categories: recruit and 
Marine Corps background. 
Recruit background characteristics were composed of 
HSDG status, AFQT score, meeting height/weight standards, 
race, gender, region of origin, marital status, and age at 
entry.  As found in previous studies, HSDG provided the 
best predictor of for successful completion.  In addition, 
as in prior studies, higher AFQT scores once again 
indicated higher success rates.  As expected, those who 
entered exceeding weight standards had lower attrition 
rates. 
Marine Corps background variables included whether or 
not the recruit entered from the DEP, month of the year 
entered the Corps, and the program for which the recruit 
enlisted.  Within this category, the most important 
predictor was whether the recruit shipped from the DEP or 
shipped during the month that he enlisted.  This is 
attributed to the fact that the DEP itself serves as a 
place to weed out those who may attrite once shipped.  
Additionally, recruits have had more time to reflect on 
their decision and have probably received their choice of 
ship month and/or enlistment program, such as aviation, 
ground, or open contract. 
The overall findings of this study concluded that the 
characteristics that predicted success in one category 
could generally be associated with predicting success in 
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the other categories as well.  Those applicants who were 
HSDGs, scored in the top 50 percent on the AFQT, assessed 
from the DEP, and those already conforming to weight 
standards continue to have the highest attrition and 
retention rates in the Marine Corps.  These findings are 
consistent with other studies completed prior to and since 
this analysis. 
 
4. Bruno (2005) 
In his Naval Postgraduate School thesis, Bruno 
analyzed many variables considered to affect attrition 
rates in the DEP based on prior research and his past 
involvement in the recruiting process.  By interacting 
these variables with each other and variables associated 
with the day of the month enlisted, Bruno attempted to test 
for a phenomenon, known as the “hockey stick effect,” which 
tend to occur in meeting monthly recruiting goals.  Simply 
stated, it describes the end of the month rush to meet each 
recruiter’s assigned goal, or mission.  Just as a hockey 
stick is level at its base and rises sharply towards the 
handle, Bruno proposes that the level of work required for 
recruiters to achieve their mission can be measured in the 
same fashion. 
The data, collected from TFDW for FY00 and FY01, was 
analyzed to discover if this end of the month drive created 
an applicant with higher DEP attrition rates than their 
peers who enlisted earlier in the month.  After regressing 
a multitude of variables, Bruno elected to focus on age, 
component (active or reserve duty), the number of days 
between taking the ASVAB and signing the enlistment papers, 
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AFQT score, and whether the applicant enlisted in the first 
three weeks of the month or later.   
The author created variables to further sub-categorize 
age, AFQT scores, and the number of days between the time 
of taking the ASVAB and enlisting.  By interacting the 
variables against each other, he created 56 different 
groups into which an applicant might fall.  Twenty-Five of 
the groups were for those who enlisted as high school 
seniors and thirty-one categories were for those who 
already graduated from high school.  For each of these 
groups, a DEP discharge rate was determined for those who 
enlisted prior to the last five days of the month and for 
those enlisting during the last five.  By looking at the 
attrition rates, he developed six categories (three for 
seniors, three for graduates).  The first category 
exhibited lower attrition rates no matter what day of the 
month they enlisted.  The second category showed higher 
rates no matter what day they enlisted.  The final category 
experienced lower attrition rates during the first three 
weeks of the month but higher rates when enlisted at the 
end of the month, referred to as the high-risk group.  In 
order to show the “hockey stick effect,” the author 
analyzed the discharge rates over the course of the last 
ten days.  Statistics showed that the level of discharge 
increased as the days came closer to the end of the month 
deadline.  Bruno proposes that recent drug usage, 
concealment of past police and/or medical problems, and a 
quick sell to individuals who are unsure about becoming a 
Marine are just some of the problems plaguing the end of 
month applicants. 
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The author states that past policy to lower DEP 
attrition was to direct recruiters to spend more time with 
DEP poolees.  This policy, although effective, is counter-
productive.  Additional time spent with poolees is taken 
from time that could be spent pursuing better contacts.  
Marine recruiters already work longer hours and take less 
leave than recruiters in any other service in order to meet 
their mission (GAO report GAO/T-NSIAD-00-102, 2000).  By 
identifying those at a higher risk of attrition, recruiters 
can focus their time on the select few who require the 
additional attention to stay motivated to ship to MCRD 
training.  Although this would lower attrition, Bruno 
contends it would not have a significant impact on this 
high-risk category since the attrition is likely caused by 
recruiters deciding to accept high-risk applicants in order 
to meet end of the month goals. 
Bruno proposes several additional policies aimed to 
lower the attrition of the high-risk group.  One policy is 
barring those identified in the high-risk group from 
enlisting during the last five days of the month.  This 
would prevent gambling to achieve the end of the month 
goal.  An additional recommendation is to require 
additional screening of these low quality applicants by a 
Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS) screening team.  
Those who do not pass the MEPS screening should be reviewed 
by the recruiting station Commanding Officer prior to the 
signing of enlistment paperwork.  Although additional work 
would be required of the command group during the final 
week, the benefit of reduced attrition would certainly 
outweigh the costs. 
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A possible policy also mentioned by Bruno is to reduce 
the DEP time for low-quality applicants enlisting during 
the last week of the month.  Bruno offers this as an option 
but states that without further analysis the results cannot 
be provided.  This thesis provides further analysis of the 
low-quality applicant.  After matching categories of 
recruits with Bruno’s DEP categories, there was no 
significance in the attrition rates.  It must be pointed 
out that this analysis is not complete due to the missing 
data of applicants who self-selected themselves out of the 
DEP program.  Although the attrition rates do not show 
significance, it only analyzes those high-risk applicants 
who elected to ship to a MCRD.  For a complete analysis, a 
prediction model would have to be created to attempt 
predictions of how well those who self-selected out of the 
DEP would have done in boot camp.  That model is beyond the 





III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA COLLECTION 
The data used for this study was derived from the 
Marine Corp’s Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW).  The data 
were collected on November 27, 2005, using the most up to 
date information posted to the master header information 
file.  The data file contained 54,832 observations of those 
applicants who shipped to recruit training between October 
1, 2003 and April 30, 2005.  The April cutoff date was 
chosen to give the cohort of new recruits a full seven 
months to complete the 11-week training cycle.  Also, extra 
time was given for completion of recruit training to 
compensate for recruit recycling due to injuries or 
training failures.   
 
B. DATA SUMMARY 
Initially, the data were compiled, analyzed, and 
validated in Microsoft Excel.  Entries with critical 
missing fields or obviously erroneous entries were deleted.  
Additional fields were created in order to calculate age 
and the date of the month when each applicant enlisted.  
Only Tier one applicants (regular high school graduates, 
adult diploma holders, and non-graduates with at least 15 
hours of college credits) and high-school seniors were 
included in the data set.  Tier two recruits were deleted 
due to their relatively small numbers.  After scrubbing the 
data, 52,199 observations remained for analysis.  Table 3.1 
describes the variables downloaded from TFDW as well as 
those created by the author for use in the multivariate 
regression models. 
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Table 3.1 Data Descriptions 
 
Variable Description 
SSN* =Recruit's Social Security Number 
DOB* =Recruit's Date of Birth 
Age** =Recruit's Age in years  
Male** =1 if Male; 0 otherwise 
Female** =1 if Female; 0 otherwise 
Married** =1 if Married; 0 otherwise 
Single** =1 if Single; 0 otherwise 
White** =1 if White; 0 otherwise 
Black** =1 if Black; 0 otherwise 
Other** =1 if Other; 0 otherwise 
Active** =1 if Active Duty; 0 otherwise 
Reserve** =1 if Reservist; 0 otherwise 
AFQT_Score* =Recruit's AFQT Score 
Ship_Date* =Date Recruit Shipped to MCRD 
MCRD_Drop_Date* =Date Recruit was Discharged from MCRD 
Days_At_MCRD_Before_Drop** =Days Spent at MCRD Before Discharge 
MCRD_Drop_Reason* =Reason Recruit was Discharged from MCRD 
MCRD_Graduation_Date* =Date Recruit graduated MCRD 
Senior** =1 if Enlisted as a Senior; 0 otherwise 
Graduate** =1 if Enlisted after Graduating; 0 otherwise 
I** =1 if Mental_Group I; 0 otherwise 
II** =1 if Mental_Group II; 0 otherwise 
IIIA** =1 if Mental_Group IIIA; 0 otherwise 
IIIB** =1 if Mental_Group IIIB; 0 otherwise 
IV** =1 if Mental_Group IV; 0 otherwise 
Date_Of_Enlistment* =Date Recruit Signed Enlistment Paperwork 
Last_Day** =1 if Enlisted On Last Day of Month; 0 otherwise 
Last_2_Days** =1 if Enlisted During Last 2 Days of the Month; 0 
otherwise 
Last_3_Days** =1 if Enlisted During Last 3 Days of the Month; 0 
otherwise 
Last_4_Days** =1 if Enlisted During Last 4 Days of the Month; 0 
otherwise 
Last_5_Days** =1 if Enlisted During Last 5 Days of the Month; 0 
otherwise 
Last_6_Days** =1 if Enlisted During Last 6 Days of the Month; 0 
otherwise 
Last_7_Days** =1 if Enlisted During Last 7 Days of the Month; 0 
otherwise 
Last_8_Days** =1 if Enlisted During Last 8 Days of the Month; 0 
otherwise 
Last_9_Days** =1 if Enlisted During Last 9 Days of the Month; 0 
otherwise 
Last_10_Days** =1 if Enlisted During Last 10 Days of the Month; 0 
otherwise 
Begin_Of_Month** =1 if Enlisted Prior to the Last 5 Days Of the 
Month; 0 otherwise 
Final_Week** =1 if Enlisted During the Last 5 Days Of the Month; 
0 otherwise 
*Field Pulled From TFDW **Field Created by Author 
Created by Author 
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C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics for selected variables from the 
data file are shown in Table 3.2.  As expected, the recruit 
depots are inhabited by a younger, mostly male population.  
Over 92 percent of the sample was male and the majority of 
the recruits were 18 to 20 years olds.  White enlistees 
accounted for 61.4 percent of all new recruits while 
Black/African-American enlistees made up 6.2 percent of the 
pool.  At the time of enlistment, 62.2 percent were 
classified as graduates while 37.8 percent were high school 
seniors.  Less than 3 percent of the recruits were married 
at the time they enlisted.  Of the sample, 10.6 percent 
failed to complete recruit training and are classified as 
Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) attrites.  High quality 
recruits, those scoring in the top 50 percent based on 
their Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score 
(Category I-IIIA), (and who were in Tier 1 on the 
educational credentials) accounted for 70.5 percent of all 
enlistees. 
One interesting observation is that over 30 percent of 
the sample declined to list their race.  When contacted by 
the author, TFDW administrators noted that this field was 
the default field when incorrectly left blank, even if 
entries such as ethnicity were filled in.  This is 
presently being corrected and in the future will reflect a 
blank field or a choice by the enlistee to decline to 
indicate his or her race. 
Another interesting observation is the number of 
applicants that enlisted toward the end of the month.  Six 
percent enlisted on the last day of the month.  Also, over 
one-quarter of all enlistees signed within the last five 
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days of the month, and almost one-half of the applicants 
enlisted within the last ten days of the month. 
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables and Discharge 








< 19 64.24* 8.86
< 22 85.53* 11.50
< 28 99.04* 12.63
< 36 100.0* 14.43
Gender 
MALE 92.94 9.90
FEMALE  7.06 20.11
Marital Status 
SINGLE 96.72 10.47
MARRIED  2.84 15.50
Race 
WHITE 61.41 10.62
BLACK  6.21 12.98





Mental Group (AFQT Score) 




IV  0.75 12.85
Day of Month Enlisted 









*Percentage is cumulative 
Created by Author 
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The quantity and percentage of discharges by level of 
education (high-school senior versus high-school graduate), 
gender and race, and day of month enlisted are listed in 
Table 3.3 through Table 3.6.  The data show that the number 
and percentage of discharges is relatively proportional to 
the group’s proportion of the sample For example, in Table 
3.3, seniors account for 37.81 percent of all enlistees in 
the sample and make up 32.80 percent of the attrites (9.21 
percent attrition rate).  Graduates make up the remaining 
62.19 percent while accounting for 67.20 percent of all 
discharges during the period (11.47 percent attrition 
rate)...  
 
Table 3.3 Number and Percentage of Attrites by Education 
Level 
 




Created by Author 
 
Table 3.4 separates attrites by gender.  Females 
represent 7.06 percent of the enlisted sample and 13.37 
percent all attrites (20.11 percent attrition rate).  Male 
enlistees make up 92.94 percent of recruits while 
accounting for 86.63 percent of all discharges during the 






Table 3.4 Number and Percentage of Attrites by Gender 
 
Gender Quantity Percentage 
Female 741 13.37% 
Male 4801 86.63% 
Total 5542 100.00% 
Created by Author 
 
Table 3.5 shows that white enlistees make up 61.41 
percent of the sample and 61.40 percent of the attrites 
(10.62 percent attrition rate).  Blacks account for 6.21 
percent of all enlistees and 7.60 percent of all attriters 
(12.98 percent attrition rate).  Those who declined to 
respond to race accounted for 30.10 of enlistees and 29.18 
of those discharged (10.29 percent attrition rate).  
Asians, Hawaiians, and Native Americans were classified as 
other and account for 2.28 percent of the sample and 
combined to account for 1.77 percent of those who failed to 
graduate (8.49 percent attrition rate). 
 
Table 3.5 Number and Percentage of Attrites by Race 
 
Race Quantity Percentage












Table 3.6 shows that recruits who enlisted on the last 
day of the month accounted for 6.81 percent of the sample 
and 7.22 percent of the attriters (11.25 percent attrition 
rate).  Those enlisting during the last week totaled 25.46 
percent of the sample and 26.02 percent of the discharges 
(10.85 percent attrition rate).  Recruits who enlisted 
during the last ten days of the month made up 48.10 percent 
of the sample and 48.48 percent of the discharges (10.70 
percent attrition rate). 
 
Table 3.6 Number and Percentage of Attrites by Day of Month 
Enlisted 
 
Day of Month Quantity Percentage
Last Day 400 7.22%
Final Week 1442 26.02%
Last 10 Days 2687 48.48%
Total 5542 100.00%
Created by Author 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
To test the impact of the day of the month of 
enlistment on MCRD attrition, multiple regression analysis 
was chosen because of its ability to explicitly control for 
the countless factors that simultaneously affect the 
dependent variable (Wooldridge, 68), in this case 
attrition.  A LOGIT model was specified using a binary 
dependent variable (DISCHARGE) regressed on a variable 
denoting which day of the month an applicant enlisted along 
with several demographic variables (AGE, GENDER, RACE etc).   
The estimated equation is defined as: 
0 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ... k ky x xβ β β= + +  
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where yˆ  is the predicted probability of discharge, 0βˆ  is 
the intercept, 1 xβ β−  are parameters that measure the 
predicted change in the probability of discharge when an 





IV. MODEL ESTIMATION 
A. MODELS 
To determine if recruits who enlisted at the end of 
the month exhibited higher Marine Corps Recruit Depot 
(MCRD) attrition rates than those who enlisted earlier in 
the month, a binary variable (DISCHARGE) was regressed on 
different factors that were identified in the literature 
review (see above) as predictors of attrition.  Three 
versions of the model were run.  The models were identical 
except that the variable indicating day of month enlisted 
varied.  Table 4.1 lists the differences in each model, 
numbering them for easy reference.  All of the control 
variables in the model were identical 
 
Table 4.1 Description of Attrition Models 
 
Model Time of Month Variable 
1 LAST_DAY (Base Model) 
2 FINAL_WEEK 
3 LAST_10_DAYS 
Created by Author 
 
B. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
For the base model (model 1), the binary discharge 
variable (DISCHARGE) was regressed on gender (FEMALE), 
education level (GRADUATE), age (AGE), Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) score (AFQT_SCORE), component 
(ACTIVE), race indicators (BLACK, OTHER, DECLINED), and a 
variable identifying marital status at entry (MARRIED).  In 
addition, a binary variable identifying time of month 
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enlisted was also included (LAST_DAY).  The specification 
for model 1 is as follows: 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10
DISCHARGE = + (FEMALE)+ (GRADUATE)+ (AGE)+
(AFQT_SCORE)+ (ACTIVE)+ ( BLACK)+ (OTHER)+
(DECLINED)+ (MARRIED)+ (LAST_DAY)
where all variables are defined in table 4.2
β β β β
β β β β
β β β  
Model 2 and model 3 have the same specification, with 
the exception of the end-of-the month variable.  In model 
2, FINAL_WEEK is used whereas in model 3 LAST_10_DAYS is 
used. 
  
C. HYPOTHESIS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1. Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this study is: 
o Ho: Recruits enlisted towards the end of the 
month have the same MCRD attrition rates as those 
recruited prior to the last ten days of the 
month. 
o H1: MCRD attrition rates are affected by the 
“hockey stick effect.”  Recruiters, under 
pressure from end-of-month-goals, enlist lower 
quality recruits at the end of the month to meet 
their mission.  This results in a statistically 
different attrition rate. 
 
2. Variable Description   
Table 4.2 describes the variables used in basic model.  
Variables used in the model were included because they had 
been found to be significant predictors of attrition in 
previous research. 
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MALE =1 if male; 0 otherwise 
FEMALE =Female is omitted category 
Education Code  
GRADUATE =1 if HS graduate; 0 otherwise 
SENIOR =HS senior is omitted category 
Age  
AGE =Age at enlistment (in years) 
AFQT  
AFQT_SCORE =Numeric score from the ASVAB 
Component  
ACTIVE =1 if enlisted for active duty; 0 otherwise 
RESERVE =Recruit enlisted as a reservist is omitted category 
Race  
WHITE =Recruit was white is omitted category 
BLACK =1 if recruit was black; 0 otherwise 
OTHER =1 if recruit was Asian, Pacific Islander, or Native 
American; 0 otherwise 
DECLINED =1 if declined to answer; 0 otherwise 
Marital Status  
SINGLE =Recruit was single is omitted category 
MARRIED =1 if recruit while married; 0 otherwise 
Day Enlisted  
BEGIN_OF_MONTH =Enlisted during first 3 weeks of the month was omitted
LAST_10_DAYS =Enlisted during the last 10 days of the month 
FINAL_WEEK =Enlisted during the last 5 days of the month 
LAST_DAY =1 if enlisted on last day of month 
Attrition  
DISCHARGE =1 if recruit discharged before graduating MCRD; 0 
otherwise 
Created by Author 
 
3. Descriptive Statistics 
The base model descriptive statistics are listed in 
Table 4.3.  Each variable is listed along with its mean, 
and standard deviation and minimum and maximum.  With the 




dummy variables, defined to have a value of zero if the 
recruit does not fit that variable and a value of one if 
the recruit does fit. 
 
Table 4.3 Model 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
MALE 0.92940 0.25615 0 1 
GRADUATE 0.62187 0.48492 0 1 
AGE 19.48392 2.18728 17 35 
AFQT_SCORE 61.83931 18.82231 21 99 
ACTIVE 0.83687 0.36948 0 1 
BLACK 0.06215 0.24142 0 1 
OTHER 0.02280 0.14926 0 1 
DECLINED 0.30100 0.45870 0 1 
MARRIED 0.02843 0.16620 0 1 
LAST_DAY 0.06814 0.25199 0 1 
FINAL_WEEK 0.25460 0.43564 0 1 
LAST_10_DAYS 0.48101 0.49964 0 1 
DISCHARGE 0.10617 0.30806 0 1 
Created by Author 
 
The means in Table 4.3 indicate that males account for 
92.94 percent of the sample while graduates make up 62.18 
percent of all enlistees.  The average recruit is 19.48 
years old and received a 61.84 AFQT score.  Those who 
enlisted for active duty make up 83.69 percent of the 
population.  Over 6 percent of recruits are black, while 
2.28 percent are other (Asian, Pacific Islander, or Native 
American).  Married enlistees accounted for 2.84 percent of 
all recruits.  Of those who shipped to MCRD during the 
period, 6.81 percent enlisted on the final day of the 
month.  Over 25 percent enlisted during the final week and 
48.10 percent enlisted during the last ten days.  
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4. Hypothesized Relationships of Variables 
The hypothesized relationships between MCRD attrition 
and the various explanatory variables are shown in Table 
4.4.  This section provides an explanation for the 
hypothesized effect of each variable. 
 

















Created By Author 
 
a. Gender 
The variable for gender equals one if the recruit 
is male.  Due to the military predominantly being a male 
environment, it is expected that female recruits will 
attrite at a rate higher than their male counterparts will.  
This hypothesis is also supported by prior research cited 
in the literature review.  In addition, pregnancy is an 
added barrier for female recruits, accounting for almost 2 
percent of female attrition.  Attrition codes confirmed 
that these pregnancies did not occur after the female 
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shipped to MCRD.  The unknown pregnancy was discovered 
during the medical screening, but the recruit shipped to 
recruit training before the disclosure was made, thus 
affecting the MCRD attrition rate. 
 
b. Education Code 
Variables identifying education code separate 
those who enlisted while still in high school from those 
who graduated previously.  Due to high school seniors 
usually having more time to consider their choice and their 
younger age while undergoing training, it is expected that 
they will have a lower attrition rate than graduates. 
 
c. Age 
The AGE variable identifies the recruit’s age in 
years at the time of enlistment.  The Marine Corps is 
restricted from enlisting applicants who are under the age 
of 17 or older than 35.  For a number of reasons, previous 
studies show that attrition rates increase with age.  Part 
of this higher attrition may be due to physical abilities 
and limitations.  In the past, recommendations have been 
made to restrict accessions of older recruits during times 
of surplus applicants (Quester, 1993). 
 
d. AFQT Score 
An applicant’s AFQT score affects attrition in 
two ways.  One of the Marine Corps’ recruiting goals is to 
attract the brightest, best-qualified applicants.  
Recruiting smarter applicants may lower the rate of 
attrition.  On the other hand, brighter enlistees with a 
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higher AFQT may have superior opportunities in the civilian 
sector such as better paying jobs and the prospect of 
college, which may increase their chances of attrition.  
Conversely, applicants with lower AFQT scores may have 
greater incentives to complete the training since they have 
poorer civilian opportunities, causing a positive 
correlation between AFQT and attrition. 
 
e. Component Code 
The variable ACTIVE is expected to be negatively 
associated with DISCHARGE.  Applicants enlisting as a 
reservist may enlist only to receive money for college.  
Some were originally active duty enlistees who desired to 
drop from the Delayed Entry Program (DEP), only to be 
resold on the enlistment by their recruiter trying to keep 
mission numbers high.  
 
f. Race 
Race is captured by a set of dummy variables, 
indicating whether the recruit is white, black, other race, 
or declined to respond.  The variable OTHER includes 
American Indians, Native Alaskans, Hawaiian and other 
Pacific Islanders, and Asians.  Past research has shown 
minorities tend to have lower attrition rates.  This has 
been attributed to the gap theory and fewer employment and 
educational opportunities in the civilian work force.  In 
addition, some cultures show a stronger sense of commitment 
and work ethic, increasing the probability that they will 




g. Marital Status 
The marital status dummy variable equals one for 
married recruits.  Married recruits have others who depend 
on them and thus may have a stronger desire for employment.  
They may also possess an additional level of maturity over 
single recruits.  Thus, married recruits are expected to 
have a lower attrition rate from the MCRD. 
 
h. Day of the Month Enlisted 
To test the hypothesis that applicants who enlist 
at the end of the month attrite at a higher rate, three 
different binary variables were created to measure the 
effect of enlisting towards the end of the month.  LAST_DAY 
represents those who enlisted on the last day of the month.  
FINAL_WEEK corresponds to applicants enlisting during the 
last five days of the month, to include the last day.  
LAST_10_DAYS indicates the group of applicants who enlisted 
during the last ten days of the month, including the final 
week and the last day.  It is expected that since such a 
large portion (almost half) of the population enlisted 
during the last third of the month the association between 
attrition and all three of the end-of-month variables will 
be positive. 
 
D. INTERPRETING THE BASIC MODEL RESULTS 
1. Evaluation 
Results of estimating model 1 are listed in Table 4.5 
and Table 4.6.  Table 4.5 lists the parameter estimate ( β ) 
and the standard error for each β , while Table 4.6 displays 
odds ratios and marginal effects.   
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The odds ratio compares the probability of MCRD 
discharge rates being the same for the base case and the 
characteristic represented by the independent variable.  A 
ratio of one indicates that the probability is the same.  
An odds ratio greater than one implies that the discharge 
rate probability is greater for the base case.  A number 
less than one indicates a greater probability for the 
independent variable than that of the base case.   
Marginal effects show the effect the independent 
variable has on the probability of MCRD attrition.  In 
particular, the marginal effect provides the effect of a 
one unit change in the independent variable on the 
probability of attrition. 
Statistical significance is determined by evaluating 
the p-value (Pr > ChiSq).  Asterisks indicate variables 
that are statistically significant and the level of 
significance shown.  The smaller the value, the stronger 
the evidence that the null hypothesis (Ho) should be 
rejected.  Usual cutoff limits for significance are: 
• p-value > 0.1 indicates some evidence against Ho. 
• 0.05 < p-value ≤ 0.1 indicates greater 
significance against Ho. 
• 0.01 < p-value ≤ 0.05 indicates moderate 
significance against Ho. 
• 0.001 < p-value ≤ 0.01 indicates strong 
significance against Ho. 
• p-value < 0.001 indicates very strong evidence 
against Ho (Jaisingh, 2000). 
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To summarize the results, based on the decision 
guidelines, the results in Tables 4.5 through 4.10 indicate 
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected that the 
estimated coefficient for LAST_DAY, FINAL_WEEK, or 
LAST_10_DAYS is statistically different from zero.  The 
results show that it cannot be concluded that the day of 
enlistment has a statistically significant effect on the 
MCRD attrition rate. 
 






Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.1636 0.1488 211.4768 <.0001 
MALE -0.8174 0.0442 341.9925 <.0001* 
GRADUATE 0.1098 0.0354 9.6549 0.0019* 
AGE 0.0555 0.00726 58.5229 <.0001* 
AFQT_SCORE -0.00735 0.00078 88.7405 <.0001* 
ACTIVE 0.0793 0.0401 3.9116 0.048** 
BLACK 0.0944 0.0564 2.7992 0.0943***
OTHER -0.2687 0.1062 6.4046 0.0114** 
DECLINED -0.0456 0.0322 2.013 0.156 
MARRIED 0.1889 0.0768 6.0439 0.014** 
LAST_DAY 0.0128 0.0556 0.0527 0.8184 
N=52,199 *significant at .01 level 
Chi-square=554.3975 **significant at .05 level 
DF=10 p=<.0001 ***significant at .10 level 
Created by Author 
 
Estimated Logit coefficients are presented in Table 
4.5 for the model that includes the LAST_DAY variable.  The 
estimated coefficients are used to compute marginal 
effects, which show the effect of the independent variable 
on MCRD attrition.  Marginal effects are displayed in Table 
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4.6, column 2.  The variable MALE from Table 4.6 has a 
marginal effect of -0.0548, indicating that male recruits 
are 5.48 percentage points less likely to attrite from 
recruit training than females.  The full results of Table 
4.5 and 4.6 are discussed in section D.3 of this chapter. 
 


















Created by Author 
 
The results of model 2, which exams the attrition 
effects of recruits who enlisted during the final week of 
the month, are listed in Table 4.7 and Table 4.8.  The full 














Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.1636 0.1489 211.0870 <.0001  
MALE -0.8175 0.0442 342.0743 <.0001 * 
GRADUATE 0.1100 0.0353 9.6763 0.0019 * 
AGE 0.0555 0.00726 58.5769 <.0001 * 
AFQT_SCORE -0.00735 0.00078 88.8797 <.0001 * 
ACTIVE 0.0794 0.0401 3.9171 0.0478 ** 
BLACK 0.0943 0.0564 2.7982 0.0944 ***
OTHER -0.2688 0.1062 6.4087 0.0114 ** 
DECLINED -0.0457 0.0322 2.0201 0.1552 
MARRIED 0.1889 0.0768 6.0427 0.0140 ** 
FINAL_WEEK 0.00221 0.0327 0.0046 0.9461 
N=52,199 *significant at .01 level 
Chi-square=554.3495 **significant at .05 level 
DF=10 p=<.0001 ***significant at .10 level 
Created by Author 
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The results of Model 3, which examines the attrition 
effects of those who enlisted during the last ten days of 
the month, are listed in Table 4.9 and Table 4.10.  The 
results of both tables are discussed more fully in section 
D.3 of this chapter. 
 






Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.1607 0.1493 209.4616 <.0001  
MALE -0.8176 0.0442 342.1511 <.0001 * 
GRADUATE 0.1100 0.0353 9.6885 0.0019 * 
AGE 0.0556 0.00726 58.6818 <.0001 * 
AFQT_SCORE -0.00736 0.000780 88.0695 <.0001 * 
ACTIVE 0.0793 0.0401 3.9080 0.0481 ** 
BLACK 0.0944 0.0564 2.8029 0.0941 ***
OTHER -0.2690 0.1062 6.4198 0.0113 ** 
DECLINED -0.0459 0.0322 2.0383 0.1534 
MARRIED 0.1890 0.0768 6.0456 0.0139 ** 
LAST_10_DAYS 0.00549 0.0286 0.0367 0.8480 
N=52,199 *significant at .01 level 
Chi-square=554.3975 **significant at .05 level 
DF=10 p=<.0001 ***significant at .10 level 
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2. Base Case Individual 
The “base case” recruit establishes the baseline 
probability of attrition.  The base line recruit is 
described as a single, white female who enlisted as a 
senior in high school.  The recruit enlisted prior to the 
last 10 days of the month for duty in the Marine Corps 
Reserves.  She is of average age and AFQT score as listed 
in Table 4.3.  
 
3. Variable Interpretation 
a. Gender 
Tables 4.5, 4.7, and 4.9 indicate that, as 
expected, females in this study have a higher attrition 
rate than their male recruit counterparts.  The marginal 
effects of all three models indicate that males are 5.48 
percentage points less likely to attrite than females, 
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ceteris paribus.  This supports the hypothesis that female 
recruits are more likely to attrite than male recruits.    
 
b. Education Code 
Recruits who enlisted after graduating high 
school are 1.06 percentage points more likely to attrite 
from recruit training. It may be that, after waiting in the 
DEP for up to a year, a recruit has had plenty of time to 
consider his decision whereas a graduate may enlist more 
hastily to get money for bills and with less time to 
consider all options.  Once at recruit training, the 
graduate may second guess the decision and fall out of 
training.     
 
c. Age 
Not surprisingly, age was highly correlated with 
the discharge rate.  The base case age for all three models 
was 19.48 years.  For each additional year of age, the odds 
of attriting increase 15 percentage points.  This supports 
the hypothesis that younger recruits are better suited to 
successfully complete recruit training than older recruits. 
  
d. AFQT Score 
AFQT also was a significant predictor of training 
attrites.  For a one-point increase in AFQT score, the 
attrition rate was reduced by 3.51 percentage points.  This 





e. Component Code 
There was some statistical significance between 
recruits who enlisted for duty as a reservist and those who 
enlisted for active duty.  Active duty recruits are 0.01 
percent more likely to attrite than reservists are.  It may 
be that those enlisting for college benefits do not have 
other means of attending and are more committed to success 
to obtain that benefit.  While this is of moderate 




The statistical significance of the race 
variables differed considerably.  There was no difference 
in attrition between the base case and those who ‘declined 
to respond’.  However, attrition rates for Black recruits 
had an attrition rate that was 0.01 percentage points 
higher than the base case and this difference was 
statistically significant.  Those classified as “other” 
also showed some significance, but were 0.02 percentage 
points less likely to fall out of recruit training than the 
base case. 
 
g. Marital Status 
Being married at the time of enlistment showed 
some predictive power with the attrition rate 0.02 
percentage points higher for single recruits.  It may be 
that distractions from home outweigh the desire to provide 
for the future of their family. 
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h. Day of the Month Enlisted 
Surprisingly, none of the variables measuring 
end-of-month enlistment were statistically significant 
predictors of attrition.  Of all variables tested, those 
indicating end of the month of enlistment revealed the 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
After analyzing the effect of the day-of-month 
enlistment on Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) attrition, 
the data provide the following conclusions. 
• Most importantly, the day of the month a recruit 
enlists was not a significant predictor of the 
attrition probability.  This study looked at 
several different variables that captured the 
effect of the end-of-the-month of enlistment, 
including last day of the month, last week of the 
month, or last ten-days of the month.  There was 
no evidence found to suggest any significant 
relationship between an end-of-the-month 
enlistment and MCRD attrition. 
• As noted in previous studies, female recruits are 
almost 5.5 percentage points more likely than 
males to attrite from recruit training. 
• Race is of statistical, but not practical, 
significance.  Black recruits are 0.01 percentage 
points more likely to fail to graduate than white 
recruits.  On the other hand, Asians, Pacific 
Islanders and Native Americans are 0.02 
percentage points more likely to complete recruit 
training that white recruits.   
• As expected, younger recruits are more likely to 
succeed at recruit training than are older 
recruits.  For every one-year increase in a 
recruit’s age, the probability that a recruit 
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will fail to graduate from recruit training 
increases by 15 percentage points.   
• The data show a recruit’s Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (AFQT) score is an accurate 
predictor of success at recruit training.  For 
the sample, a one-point increase in AFQT score 
reduced the likelihood of failing MCRD training 
by 3.51 percentage points. 
 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study show that there is no 
statistically significant effect of the day of the month a 
recruit enlists and the attrition rate at recruit training.  
The initial purpose of this study was to provide data to 
extend previous research on Delayed Entry Program (DEP) 
attrition rates (Bruno, 2005).  Bruno found that a small 
percentage of applicants who enlisted during the last week 
of the month had high DEP attrition rates. 
Bruno also created many sub-groups of individuals with 
selected characteristics who enlisted during the last days 
of the month and found that many of the sub-groups had high 
DEP attrition risk.  This thesis attempted to create the 
same sub-groups as in Bruno and assess their MCRD attrition 
risk.  As in the overall results, the statistical analysis 
of the numerous sub-groups could find no statistically 
significant predictive factors based on the time of the 
month of enlistment.  The statistical output for these 
subgroups is listed in the tables located in Appendix A and 
Appendix B.   
Chapter II pointed out that one major reason this 
thesis found no effect of pre-service characteristics on 
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MCRD attrition is selection of individuals who leave the 
DEP.  That is, members of an initial entry cohort who 
attrite from the DEP are no longer reflected in the cohort 
members who continue onto recruit training.  The remaining 
group has a much stronger taste for the military than those 
who selected out of the DEP.  Thus, their propensity to 
remain in the military is much higher than the average 
recruit who enters the Delayed Entry Pool. 
The results cannot be used to support Bruno’s 
recommendation of shipping the high-category recruits to 
MCRD earlier than their peers as a policy of lowering the 
DEP attrition rate.  The data show that, although primarily 
used as a tool to plan for even shipment of recruits to 
MCRD throughout the year, the DEP also provides an 
effective screening mechanism.  Instead of being alarmed by 
the high DEP attrition rates, they may be viewed as an 
overhead cost.  Shipping the high-risk applicants early may 
lower DEP attrition but only at the expense of higher MCRD 
attrition.  This will not solve anything because any 
increase in the MCRD attrition rate will significantly cost 
the Marine Corps more than an equivalent amount of DEP 
attrition.  Bruno conservatively estimated that each 
applicant discharged from the DEP cost the Marine Corps 
over $1,200.  This cost is significantly higher for MCRD 
attrition.  Not only is the $1,200 loss still realized, but 
the additional costs associated with training are added as 
well.  Those who attrite towards the end of training cost 
the Marine Corps in excess of $15,000 per recruit attrite. 
The majority of the demographic variables examined in 
this study indicated the same relationships with attrition 
as in prior research.  Women have historically attrited at 
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rates higher than their male counterparts.  Females have a 
lower propensity to enlist in the military according to the 
2005 Youth Poll Report, shown in Figure 5.1.  According to 
the poll, 21 percent of male respondents indicated it was 
likely they would enlist, while only 8 percent of females 
said they would enlist (Department of Defense Youth Poll, 
2005).  This large difference in taste for the military may 
play a role in attrition rates.  If some women do not 
consider the military as a future option, it may be that 
once females do enlist, they may second-guess their 
decision which affects their ability to successfully 
complete training. 
 
Figure 5.1 Propensities to Enlist 





















After Department of Defense Youth Poll, June 2005 
 
Race also was a significant predictor of the attrition 
rate of recruits.  Black recruits attrited at a rate 
slightly higher than whites, while Asian, Pacific Islander, 
and Native American recruits performed better than both 




significant, it is doubtful that the Marine Corps would 
consider policy changes that would adversely affect equal 
opportunity for all races. 
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Changes to the DEP 
As previously mentioned, the DEP, although not 
initially intended to serve as a screening mechanism, 
actually performs that function rather effectively.  Rather 
than complain about high attrition rates, the Marine Corps 
may be best served to ensure the DEP is doing all it can to 
filter out applicants who may not complete recruit 
training.   
In June 2005, the Marine Corps Recruiting Command 
published MCRCO 1133.1A, containing instructions for 
implementing a structured pool program.  The command states 
in the mission paragraph the requirement to reduce both DEP 
and MCRD attrition by implementing a well-run pool program.  
The order is vague enough to allow each recruiting station 
commander to run the program as seen fit, within guidelines 
set by the national level.  It sets requirements for check-
in and check-out policies, and mandates a newsletter and 
minimal activities.  It mandates continuous screening and a 
system for risk assessment for those meeting attrition 
profiles.  In closing, the order states a desired result 
that DEP attrition must remain low.  By requiring low DEP 
attrition goals, all other functions are set around that 
goal.  The question remains, will recruiters actually 
screen-out applicants after working so hard to enlist them 
in fear of a higher rate? 
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To be effective, the DEP should be organized at the 
national level for uniformity, but allow for flexibility at 
the district level.  A cost estimate should be conducted to 
determine the feasibility of adding additional recruiters 
to manage the program, allowing the “street recruiters” to 
focus on obtaining new contracts.  Recruiters assigned to 
the DEP can perform the duties of running an enhanced DEP, 
mentoring and training poolees and educating parents, 
thereby increasing support for the poolee to succeed at 
MCRD training.  These recruiters would objectively screen 
for indicators of performance, contact the enlisting 
recruiter when problems arise, and assist in correcting 
problems that allow applicants to continue in the DEP.  
Focusing on poolees might improve DEP attrition without 
adversely affecting the attrition rate at MCRD.     
Adding additional recruiters does increase costs and 
takes away Marines from deploying units, but if it reduces 
attrition, the benefits may be found to outweigh the costs.  
An additional option is to rotate the duty by allowing 
recruiters to focus on new applicants for a period of time, 
then focusing on the DEP poolees for another period of 
time.  This would allow a break in the stressful daily 
routine of most recruiters.  It should be determined if 
this break allows recruiters a chance to re-energize their 
efforts, or if their recruiting rhythm is disrupted, adding 
additional stress when they return to their region.  
 
2. MCRD Experiment 
A second recommendation is to implement a pilot test 
of a recommendation from earlier research (Bruno, 2005).  
Bruno identified several sub-groups of applicants 
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exhibiting high DEP attrition rates when enlisted during 
the final week of the month.  This thesis recreated those 
demographic sub-groups and found that recruits who exhibit 
these same characteristics have the same chance of success 
once they ship to MCRD.  The missing, highly important 
piece is how those who self-selected out of the DEP would 
have fared had they actually shipped to recruit training. 
Rather than institute a nationwide policy that could 
potentially have serious negative effects, recruiting 
command might select one recruiting district for a pilot 
program.  Applying the filters in Bruno’s thesis, those who 
fall into the high-risk category can be identified and 
shipped at a rate faster than their peers.  Company 
commanders could closely monitor those recruits during the 
training process for any adverse affects.  Observation 
would be required to ensure that if the propensity to 
attrite is still higher than average, that this group of 
recruits does not plague the pool of recruits who would 
normally have normal expectations of successful completion 
of the training. 
If the attrition rates do not increase, the pilot 
program could be expanded to additional recruiting 
districts.  On the other hand, if attrition rates climb, 
the program could be terminated before serious attrition 
problems arise and additional burdens are placed on MCRD. 
An additional approach related to this recommendation 
is to study how well enlistees would do if they had not 
self-selected out of the DEP and instead had shipped to 




research can be combined with the results of Bruno’s study 
to determine if policy changes can be recommended to lower 
attrition. 
As noted in other studies, recruiting is not projected 
to get any easier in the near future.  To make recruiting 
efforts effective and efficient, the Marine Corps must do 
everything possible to ensure interested applicants ship to 
MCRD and complete their required training.  Future research 
into why enlistees leave the DEP or attrite form recruit 


























APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL RESULTS FOR HIGH SCHOOL 
SENIOR RISK CATEGORIES 
Tables A.1 through A.9 list the results for the sub-
groups that match the demographic sub-groups created by 
Bruno in his Naval Postgraduate School thesis on DEP 
attrition.  Risk Category 1 represents those enlistees who 
have low Delayed Entry Program (DEP) attrition rates that 
are not affected by day-of-the-month variables.  Risk 
Category 3 represents enlistees that exhibit high DEP 
discharge rates that are not affected by day-of-the-month 
variables.  Risk Category 2 represents enlistees who 
exhibit low DEP attrition rates during the first three 
weeks of the month but exhibit high DEP discharge rates 
when enlisted during the final week of the month.  Tables 
A.1 through A.3 list the results of a sample of seniors 
using the variable FINAL_WEEK.  Tables A.4 through A.6 list 
the results for seniors using the variable LAST_DAY.  
Tables A.7 through A.9 show the results of seniors testing 
the variable FINAL_10_DAYS.  For a detailed breakdown of 











Table A.1 Senior Risk Categories (FINAL_WEEK) 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
RISK_CAT_1_FINAL_WEEK 0.1419090 0.3489656 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.0112473 0.1054581 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_FINAL_WEEK 0.0047624 0.0688473 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.3003344 0.4584150 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_FINAL_WEEK 0.0931705 0.2906786 0 1 
Created by Author 
 






Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.3273 0.0373 3883.7857 <.0001
RISK_CAT_1_FINAL_WEEK 0.1056 0.0738 2.0518 0.1520
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.3077 0.2120 2.1058 0.1467
RISK_CAT_2_FINAL_WEEK 0.1991 0.3366 0.3500 0.5541
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.0651 0.0580 1.2562 0.2624
RISK_CAT_3_FINAL_WEEK -0.00986 0.0904 0.0119 0.9131
N=19,738 *significant at .01 level 
Chi-square=12129.681 **significant at .05 level 
DF=5 p=0.4611 ***significant at .10 level 
Created by Author 
 
Table A.3 Senior Risk Categories Odds Ratio Estimates and 
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Table A.4 Senior Risk Categories (LAST_DAY) 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
RISK_CAT_1_LAST_DAY 0.0342993 0.1820015 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.0112473 0.1054581 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_LAST_DAY 0.0013173 0.0362710 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.3003344 0.4584150 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_LAST_DAY 0.0225960 0.1486154 0 1 
Created by Author 
 
 






Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.3161 0.0314 5453.8844 <.0001
RISK_CAT_1_LAST_DAY 0.0216 0.1369 0.0249 0.8745
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.2961 0.2111 1.9679 0.1607
RISK_CAT_2_LAST_DAY 0.8813 0.4986 3.1247 0.0771
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.0539 0.0544 0.9802 0.3221
RISK_CAT_3_LAST_DAY 0.2240 0.1546 2.0982 0.1475
N=19,738 *significant at .01 level 
Chi-square=12127.599 **significant at .05 level 
DF=5 p=0.2420 ***significant at .10 level 
Created by Author 
 
Table A.6 Senior Risk Categories Odds Ratio Estimates and 
















Table A.7 Senior Risk Categories (LAST_10_DAYS) 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
RISK_CAT_1_LAST_10_DAYS 0.2728240 0.4454224 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.0112473 0.1054581 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_LAST_10_DAYS 0.0088155 0.0934784 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.3003344 0.4584150 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_LAST_10_DAYS 0.1847705 0.3881211 0 1 
Created by Author 
 







Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.3019 0.0413 3100.8994 <.0001
RISK_CAT_1_LAST_10_DAYS -0.0155 0.0631 0.0600 0.8065
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.1711 0.2359 0.5262 0.4682
RISK_CAT_2_LAST_10_DAYS 0.2890 0.2586 1.2663 0.2605
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.0371 0.0590 0.3942 0.5301
RISK_CAT_3_LAST_10_DAYS 0.00856 0.0665 0.0166 0.8976
N=19,738 *significant at .01 level 
Chi-square=12130.817 **significant at .05 level 
DF=5 p=0.6225 ***significant at .10 level 
Created by Author 
 
Table A.9 Senior Risk Categories Odds Ratio Estimates and 
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APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL RESULTS FOR HIGH SCHOOL 
GRADUATE RISK CATEGORIES 
Tables B.1 through B.9 list the results for the MCRD 
attrition model using the sub-groups created by Bruno to 
analyze DEP attrition rates of high school graduates.  Risk 
Category 1 represents those enlistees who have low Delayed 
Entry Program (DEP) attrition rates that are not affected 
by day-of-the-month variables.  Risk Category 3 represents 
enlistees that exhibit high DEP discharge rates that are 
not affected by day-of-the-month variables.  Risk Category 
2 represents enlistees who exhibit low DEP attrition rates 
during the first three weeks of the month but exhibit high 
DEP discharge rates when enlisted during the final week of 
the month.  Tables B.1 through B.3 list the results of 
graduates testing the variable FINAL_WEEK.  Tables B.4 
through B.6 list the results of graduates testing the 
variable LAST_DAY.  Tables B.7 through B.9 show the results 












Table B.1 Graduate Risk Categories (FINAL_WEEK) 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
RISK_CAT_1_FINAL_WEEK 0.1395521 0.3465270 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.1628416 0.3692267 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_FINAL_WEEK 0.0567450 0.2313583 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.1931857 0.3948035 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_FINAL_WEEK 0.0672191 0.2504050 0 1 
Created by Author 
 







Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.0690 0.0285 5264.0001 <.0001
RISK_CAT_1_FINAL_WEEK 0.1076 0.0548 0.1029 0.7484
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.0885 0.0509 3.0252 0.0820
RISK_CAT_2_FINAL_WEEK 0.0293 0.0784 0.1393 0.7089
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH -0.00043 0.0491 0.0001 0.9931
RISK_CAT_3_FINAL_WEEK 0.0988 0.0713 1.9207 0.1658
N=32,461 *significant at .01 level 
Chi-square=23125.451 **significant at .05 level 
DF=5 p=0.4544 ***significant at .10 level 
Created by Author 
 
Table B.3 Graduate Risk Categories Odds Ratio Estimates and 
















Table B.4 Graduate Risk Categories (LAST_DAY) 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
RISK_CAT_1_LAST_DAY 0.0396476 0.1951328 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.1628416 0.3692267 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_LAST_DAY 0.0156495 0.1241173 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.1931857 0.3948035 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_LAST_DAY 0.0188534 0.1360092 0 1 
Created by Author 
 






Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.0573 0.0232 7866.1176 <.0001
RISK_CAT_1_LAST_DAY 0.0836 0.0883 0.8966 0.3437
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.0768 0.0481 2.5493 0.1103
RISK_CAT_2_LAST_DAY -0.0718 0.1458 0.2425 0.6224
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH -0.0121 0.0463 0.0687 0.7933
RISK_CAT_3_LAST_DAY 0.0581 0.1269 0.2094 0.6472
N=32,461 *significant at .01 level 
Chi-square=23126.022 **significant at .05 level 
DF=5 p=0.5318 ***significant at .10 level 
Created by Author 
 
Table B.6 Graduate Risk Categories Odds Ratio Estimates and 

















Table B.7 Graduate Risk Categories (LAST_10_DAYS) 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
RISK_CAT_1_LAST_10_DAYS 0.2565540 0.4367378 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.1628416 0.3692267 0 1 
RISK_CAT_2_LAST_10_DAYS 0.1073596 0.3095747 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.1931857 0.3948035 0 1 
RISK_CAT_3_LAST_10_DAYS 0.1258125 0.3316431 0 1 
Created by Author 
 







Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq
Intercept -2.0714 0.0315 4316.6317 <.0001
RISK_CAT_1_LAST_10_DAYS 0.0393 0.0465 0.7145 0.3980
RISK_CAT_2_BEGIN_OF_MONTH 0.0933 0.0524 3.1675 0.0751
RISK_CAT_2_LAST_10_DAYS -0.00780 0.0606 0.0166 0.8975
RISK_CAT_3_BEGIN_OF_MONTH -0.0107 0.0502 0.0454 0.8313
RISK_CAT_3_LAST_10_DAYS 0.0414 0.0565 0.5367 0.4638
N=32,461 *significant at .01 level 
Chi-square=23126.235 **significant at .05 level 
DF=5 p=0.5624 ***significant at .10 level 
Created by Author 
 
Table B.9 Graduate Risk Categories Odds Ratio Estimates and 
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